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Temporary suspension of share redemptions
In addition to the well-established forms of real estate investing (direct and listed), investors can also choose
open-ended property funds (OPFs), which are considered a complementary real estate investment option.
OPF fund managers generally provide daily liquidity, and these funds must maintain at least 5% liquidity. If
liquidity falls below 5%, share redemptions will be temporarily suspended, for a period of up to two years.
During this time, investors can only sell shares on the secondary market (exchange), and are thus subject
to signiﬁcant liquidity risk. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of OPFs as an investment ve-
hicle on the risk and return proﬁle. OPFs in principle have the same underlying as direct and listed real estate
investments, but they are subject to a different regulatory regime. Therefore, we analyze the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts of OPFs in mixed-asset portfolios for various risk measures, investor types, and holding periods.
We ﬁnd that OPFs are ideally suited to reduce portfolio risk. This result holds independent of the holding pe-
riod and whether in- or out-of-sample Monte Carlo portfolio simulations are used. However, these positive
effects come at the cost of increased risk from temporary share redemption suspensions. During these pe-
riods, investors may have to accept an average 6% discount in the secondary market compared to the net
asset value calculated by OPFs themselves. These discounts can go as high as 20% if investors fear that OPF
management will not be able to ensure liquidity within the two-year time limit, and will have to “ﬁre-sell”
properties.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Overthepasttwodecades,investmentsinrealestatehaveincreased
dramatically. This growth is at least partially driven by the perceived
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts that real estate offers in multi-asset portfoli-
os. Both direct and listed real estate investments can take advantage
of these beneﬁts. However, although the underlying asset is the same,
directandlistedrealestateinvestmentshaveverydifferentinstitutional
setupsand hencedifferentrisk-return proﬁles (for example, thevolatil-
ity of respective indices for listed real estate is much higher than for
direct real estate — see Table 3). Especially liquidity risk can be very
different for varying real estate investments, and can potentially offset
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts.
In this paper, we investigate open-ended property funds (OPFs) as a
further means – besides direct and listed real estate investments – to
add real estate to institutional and private portfolios. Fund managers in-
vest directly in an internationally diversiﬁed real estate portfolio, while
holding a cash-equivalent position ranging from 5% to 49% of assets
under management for daily liquidity. The resulting historical returns
are attractive and quite consistent, with little risk and low correlation
with other asset classes. However, the downside is that OPFs must tem-
porarily suspend share redemptions if fund liquidity falls below 5% (see
Maurer et al., 2004). Fund managers will then have a maximum of two
years to either attract sufﬁcient new asset inﬂows and/or to liquidate
portfolio properties to ensure fund liquidity again. During this time, in-
vestors cannot redeem shares, but can sell them in a secondary market.
However, market prices can have discounts to thenet asset value (NAV)
of up to about 20%. Also, there is the risk that fund managers will not
have enough liquidity to reopen within the two-year time limit, and
may have to sell properties at a loss to ensure liquidity (“ﬁre-sale”). In
this case, the realized prices for the sold properties are highly uncertain.
Thus, OPF investors bear liquidity risk.
The innovative thrust of this study is threefold. We aim to 1) analyze
the impact on the return distributions of OPFs as a further investment
option besides direct and listed real estate investments (see Section 4),
2) identify the suitability of German OPFs as an essential building
block in private and institutional portfolios (Section 5), and 3) evaluate
the severity of any liquidity risk caused by temporary suspensions of
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weights of OPFs in mixed-asset portfolios by considering the trade-off
between risk (as measured by standard deviation, lower partial mo-




the positive autocorrelation that results from return-smoothing and the
non-normality of the return distribution. Furthermore, we perform sev-
eral Monte Carlo simulations (in- and out-of-sample) to evaluate OPF
characteristics in mixed-asset portfolios for different holding periods.
Ultimately,weﬁndthatOPFscanplayanimportantroleinaportfolio
context for all investor types examined here, regardless of which risk
measure is considered or which holding period is chosen. However,
there is one condition: that OPF share redemptions not be temporarily
suspended.
To investigate potential liquidity risks for OPF investors, we examine
short- and long-term valuation effects around the temporary suspension
of share redemptions during the only two periods it has occurred (2005/
2006and2008/2010).Weﬁndthatinvestorswerenotnegativelyaffected
if they did not sell their shares in the secondary market (exchange), and if
the OPFs provided liquidity before the end of the two-year time limit. In-
vestors who did sell their shares in the secondary market had to accept on
average a 6% discount off the NAV calculated by the OPFs themselves.
For OPFs unlikely to reopen before the two-year time limit, there is
high uncertainty about their NAVs compared to the realized market
prices of sold properties. In these cases, investors will be subject to
discounts as high as 20% in the secondary market.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives
an overview of the related literature. Section 3 introduces OPFs and de-
scribes the construction of an appropriate market index. Section 4 pro-
vides descriptive statistics for the index and discusses other asset
classes. Section 5 introduces the fundamentals of portfolio optimization,
andexamineshowOPFscanimpacttherisk andreturnproﬁleofefﬁcient
portfolios under several risk measures. It also illustrates the beneﬁts of
OPFs for different holding periods. Section 6 evaluates OPF liquidity risk
by presenting our examination of fund returns around the temporary
suspension of share redemptions. Section 7 summarizes our main results
and gives our conclusions.
2. Literature review
Investors' (such as insurance companies, banks, corporations and
pension funds) interest in direct and listed real estate investments has
increased dramatically in recent years. These instruments seem to pro-
videattractiveriskandreturnproﬁles,aswellashighdiversiﬁcationpo-
tential for a mixed-asset portfolio. For that reason many researchers
have studiedand attemptedto model the beneﬁts of establishingdiver-
siﬁcation strategies for portfolio investments. Within this section we
give a comprehensive overview of the evolution in the literature of di-
versiﬁcation beneﬁts for direct and listed real estate investments.
Several researchers studied the risk and return characteristics of
stocks, bonds, and cash to real estate and analyzed optimal portfolio
choice(diversiﬁcationbeneﬁts)ofdirectrealestateinvestments,includ-
ingRoss andWebb(1985), Marks (1986), Webb andRubens(1989)and
Ross and Zisler (1991).
2 Ziobrowski and Curcio (1991) extend this liter-
ature by exploringpotential beneﬁts by adding international real estate
investments to a mixed-asset portfolio.
Later studies with direct real estate investments for more countries
include Newell and Webb (1994), Quan and Titman (1997), Stevenson
(1998), Quan and Titman (1999), Chua (1999), Cheng, Ziobrowski,
Caines, and Ziobrowski (1999) and Hoesli, Lekander, and Witkiewicz
(2004). All these studies use the classical mean-variance approach and
come to the conclusion that direct real estate provides diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts.
More recent studies analyze other issues of investments in direct
real estate. Fugazza, Guidolin, and Nicodano (2007) study optimal real
estate allocation for long-horizon investors (i.e. considering return pre-
dictability). This is of major importance for long run investors, as it is
well known that when returns are predictable the mean-variance
asset allocation may differ substantially from the long-term one (see
Bodie,1995)whiletheinvestor'splanninghorizonisirrelevantforport-
foliochoicewhenreturnsareindependentlyandidenticallydistributed.
Hoevenaars, Molenaar, Schotman, and Steenkamp (2008) study direct
real estate investments in an asset-liability framework.
Mixed-asset portfolio studies using listed real estate
3 start with the
work by Asabere, Kleiman, and McGowan (1991) and Kleiman and
Farragher (1992),w h oﬁnd diversiﬁcation gains by including REITs in
the portfolios. Further evidence on diversiﬁcation beneﬁts in more
countries is given by Eichholtz (1996), Eichholtz and Koedjik (1996),
Eichholtz (1997), Mull and Soenen (1997), Gordon, Canter, and Webb
(1998), Liu and Mei (1998), Gordon and Canter (1999), Stevenson
(1999), Stevenson (2000), Maurer and Reiner (2002), Conover, Swint
Friday, and Howton (1998) and Chen, Ho, Lu, and Wu (2005).A n o t h e r
strand of the literature studies real-estate-only portfolios using REITs.
Thediversiﬁcationbeneﬁtsof internationalinvestments inREITs arestud-
ied in Giliberto (1990), Addae-Dapaah and Kion (1996), Wilson and
Okunev (1996), Eichholtz (1997), Pierzak (2001) and Bigman (2002).
Summarizing, these studies suggest that direct and listed invest-
ments in real estate are suitable for achieving diversiﬁcation beneﬁts.
However, both investment vehicles have different risk and return pro-
ﬁles, even if the underlying property is equal. This is reﬂected in a
much higher volatility for listed real estate than for direct real estate,
which can be interpreted in a way that investmentvehicle type also im-
pacts the return distribution for an equal underlying.
As an example, comparable characteristics are found in the option
market,whereinvestorscanchoosetoinvestina companysharedirectly
orindirectly,withanoptionbasedonthesamecompanyshareastheun-
derlying. Therefore, inthis analogy, investment vehicles will signiﬁcantly
impact the risk and return proﬁle because the optional investment alter-
native reshapes the original return distribution of the underlying.
3. The German OPF market
3.1. Fundamental features
From a legal perspective, an open-ended property fund is a separate
special asset, with an investment focus on property initiated and man-
aged by a capital investment company. For investor protection pur-
poses, OPFs are controlled by regulations for identifying, diversifying,
and controlling risks, as well as for realizing gains and fund liquidity.
4
Open-endedpropertyfunds wereﬁrstcreatedin1959,withtheestab-
lishment of the “Internationales Immobilien Institut” (the international
real estate institute, known as iii-investments). The ﬁrst German OPF
was iii-funds No. 1. Since 1991, there are enough OPFs for a meaningful
index formation and statistical evaluation. Especially in recent years the
growth of the market has been dramatic. In 1998, there were sixteen
OPFs, with assets under management of 43.1 billion Euros. As of February
2009, the market had grown to thirty-ﬁve funds managing 82.1 billion
Euros. The German OPF market is thus the biggest, and its market capital-
ization is about one-third of all European Union member countries.
5
1 The use of downside risk measures is important to combat potential biases that
may result from the violation of the normality assumption for many return distribu-
tions (see Sing & Ong, 2000 for a detailed discussion).
2 For a more detailed overview see the seminal paper by Sirmans and Worzala
(2003), Benjamin, Sirmans, and Zietz (1995, 2001) and Hudson-Wilson, Gordon,
Fabozzi, and Anson (2005).
3 For a more detailed overview see also Worzala, Elaine and Sirmans (2003).
4 See Investmentgesetz (InvG) and Klug (2008) for further details.
5 According to data from the BVI Bundesverband Investment, Asset Management e.V.
(German Asset Management and Investment Association), and Deutsche Bundesbank
(German Central Bank).
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through February 2009, as well as the subsamples of generally invest-
able funds and retail-investable funds. We form subgroups to examine
possible differences in the OPF market based on investability differ-
ences. We exclude from the investable OPF subsample any funds that
are closedto newinvestments.
6 Note alsothatsome funds require min-
imum investments, which can be as much as 350,000 Euros or more.
Because these funds are typically not suited for retail investors, we
also exclude them from the retail-investable subsample.
7
For our analysis, we use all OPFs that report their data to the “BVI
Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management e.V.” (the German
Asset Management and Investment Association). To test for consisten-
cy, we compare the share prices from BVI with the prices obtained
from Datastream. We ﬁnd twenty-one pricing differences, for an accu-
racy rate of 99.9%. None of the differences exceeds 1% of the stock
price.Inthecaseofapricingdifference,weaskedthecapitalinvestment
company for the price.
For the further analyses, we use all OPFs that are or were covered
by both, BVI and Datastream, which ensures the highest possible data
accuracy and that the calculated indices are not affected by a survi-
vorship bias. However, our results remain stable when all OPFs are in-
cluded. This is not surprising, as our sample covers at least 94% of the
market.
8 Therefore, we ﬁnd that the results are not affected from a bi-
ased data-generating approach.
In contrast with many other countries, German OPFs are preferred
over real estate shares as an alternative investment. OPFs offer three
signiﬁcant advantages, and the regulatory design is similar to the OPF
markets in European Union member countries
9:
(1) The OPF share price is not determined by supply and demand as
long as the OPF provides liquidity. Therefore, share prices do not
differ from theNAV per share reported bythe capital investment
companies when there is no temporary redemption suspension.
This means that OPF returns tend to be quite smooth, because
there is no additional inﬂuence from (equity) capital markets.
(2) The number of issued shares varies, which generally ensures
high liquidity. As in any investment fund, there is a daily issu-
ance of new shares from buyers and a daily redemption of old
shares from sellers.
10
(3) The rule of risk-spreading governs transactions.
11 This diversi-
ﬁcation signiﬁcantly reduces unsystematic risk.
These speciﬁc features of OPFs substantially inﬂuence their risk-
return proﬁle. In general, portfolio returns are determined by rental
income, maintenance costs, and value increases or decreases.
12 Rental
incomeandmaintenancecostsarerelativelyeasytodetermine;thepri-
mary challenge is gauging changes in value if comparable properties do
nottraderegularly.Thus,Germaninvestmentlaw(§70 para.2 sentence
2InvG)mandatesthatpropertiesbeevaluatedatleastonceayearbyan
independent appraisal board to determine the true market value. The
appraisalboardmembershavetechnicalexpertiseintheareaofproper-
ty market development (§77 para. 2 sentence 1 InvG).
Thebylawallowsthesalescomparisonapproach,thecostapproach,
and the income approach for the appraisal of fair market value. The in-
come approach is internationally accepted, and is the primary method
for valuingOPFs. It appraises a propertyonthebasis of objectively eval-
uatedpriceandincomeforecasts,aswellasdynamiccapitalizationrates
on the valuation date. Therefore, the daily OPF NAVs are based on the
annual expert appraisals since the last valuation date, but do not neces-
sarily represent “true” daily property values.
This valuation approach aims to minimize subjective views about fu-
ture expectations
13 and to dampen over- and understatements of
Table 1
Overview of the German OPF market. This table shows assets under management and the number of included OPFs, generally investable OPFs, and retail-investable OPFs. The num-
ber of included OPFs may differ from the number of available OPFs, as funds are only included when covered by BVI and Datastream. The representativeness of included funds is
indicated in the “Market Share” column, which gives the ratio of available to reported OPFs. Assets under management are calculated at year-end, except for 2009, which is as of
February. The data stem from BVI and Datastream.
Year Total market of reporting OPFs Investable OPFs Retail-investable OPFs
Number In €m Market share Number In €m Number In €m
1991 13 10.032 100% 12 10.032 12 10.032
1992 14 13.893 100% 13 13.563 13 13.563
1993 14 21.866 100% 13 21.492 13 21.492
1994 14 25.764 100% 12 25.226 12 25.226
1995 14 29.694 100% 12 29.084 12 29.084
1996 14 37.023 100% 12 36.347 12 36.347
1997 15 40.493 100% 13 39.735 13 39.735
1998 16 43.137 100% 14 42.305 14 42.305
1999 16 49.987 99% 14 49.104 14 49.104
2000 18 47.455 99% 16 46.535 16 46.535
2001 18 54.485 98% 16 54.337 16 54.337
2002 21 69.391 98% 19 69.242 19 69.242
2003 23 83.234 98% 21 83.086 20 81.799
2004 26 85.288 98% 24 84.985 23 83.145
2005 27 80.404 94% 25 80.081 23 77.982
2006 32 73.623 97% 29 72.230 25 69.630
2007 35 80.948 97% 30 78.900 26 75.840
2008 35 81.631 97% 30 79.140 26 75.565
2009 35 82.144 96% 30 79.617 26 75.979
6 The funds Aachener Grund-Fonds Nr. 1, DEGI German Business, DEGI Global Busi-
ness, KanAm SPEZIAL grundinvest Fonds, and WestInvest ImmoValue are not open to
all investors.
7 The UBS (D) Euroinvest Immobilien fund requires a 350,000 Euro minimum invest-
ment; the CS Property Dynamic fund requires a 3 million Euro minimum investment.
The SEB ImmoPortfolio Target Return Fund and the SEB Global Property Fund follow
the principle “cash on demand only,” and are available only to large investors.
8 Tables and ﬁgures are available from the authors upon request.
9 See, for example, Maurer et al. (2004).
10 Historically, there have been only two periods when share redemptions were tem-
porarily suspended (2005/2006 and 2008/2010). Both are discussed in detail in
Section 5.
11 At the time of purchase, a property may not constitute more than 15% of the OPF's
NAV. Furthermore, the total value of all properties with individual values of more than
10% of a fund's NAV may not constitute more than 50% of the fund's NAV. See InvG § 73
(1).
12 More than 40% of OPF portfolio properties have leases with residual terms that are
longer than January 1, 2014. See BVI Press Release (Attached), 2008.
13 See Archner (2006) for an extensive analysis.
92 L.H. Haß et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 21 (2012) 90–107propertyvalues.However,becausepastappraisalreportsareincludedin
the determination of current NAVs, valuation returns are smoothed, an
effectknownas“appraisal-smoothing.”
14Thissmoothing,aswellasthe
less frequent valuations, result in positive autocorrelation of the OPF
returns.
15,16 The autocorrelation thus signiﬁcantly underestimates
OPF risk.
Thus, in this paper, weperform ande-smoothingof returns asa cor-
rection (see Section 3 for more insights). We use Getmansky et al.'s
(2004) method to recompute the return series so that it is free of auto-
correlation.This method is based ontheestimation of a general moving
average process. It can detect arbitrary autocorrelation structures, and
can thus cope with annual reappraisals.
A similar problem can also be seenby comparingreal estate indices:
Those based on expert appraisals at certain valuation dates exhibit less
volatility than those based on transactions or new lease agreements.
17
In addition to the positive autocorrelation, we must also consider the
non-normality of return distributions for OPFs in our analysis.
18
3.2. Construction of open-ended property fund indices
To construct an OPF index, we need to ﬁrst calculate a representative
index. We consider all funds covered by the BVI and Datastream
19 begin-
ning in February 1991 (because we have a sufﬁcient number of funds
from this date onward), and ending in December 2008. The monthly
raw data from the OPFs contain share prices for each month-end. The
data are adjusted for share splits and reported net of management fees.
Therefore, further analysis is not biased favorably towards OPFs. Divi-
dend payouts are reinvested in the respective fund (before taxes).
ForallOPFs,wecalculateamonthlypre-taxreturnbasedonadjusted
share prices. Finally, using the continuous pretax returns of the individ-
ual funds, we calculate a value-weighted and an equal-weighted index.
Ourindexcanthusbeconsideredatotalreturnindex.Weusetheequal-
weightedindextoevaluatetherobustnessofourresultsbecauseitisnot
dominated by individual “fund heavyweights.”
20
4. PortfolioeffectsfromtheadditionofOPFs—adescriptiveanalysis
In this section, we examine other asset classes to analyze how in-
tegrating OPFs impacts asset allocation. We also discuss the effects of
adjusting for “appraisal-smoothing” and illiquidity.
We use the Nikkei 500, the S&P 500, and the DJ Stoxx 600 to rep-
resent the equity markets of Japan, the U.S., and Europe, respective-
ly. For ﬁxed income, we use the Japanese, the U.S., the European,
and the U.K. Government Bond Index bond indices from J.P. Morgan.
We consider the U.K. Government Bond Index separately because
the European Government Bond Index excludes U.K. bonds. We
also allow LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) investments,
which is the short-term money market rate.
We do not consider the German market separately (as represented
by the DAX and the REXP) because it is implicitly integrated via the Eu-
ropean market.
21 In terms of alternative investments, we use the FTSE
EPRA/NAREIT Germany index to represent exchange-listed real estate
investment trusts (REITs) as a potential alternative to OPFs.
22 We also
consider investments in hedge funds (HFRI Fund of Funds Composite
Index) and commodities (S&P GSCI).
For all indices, we use total return indices including reinvested
distributions. Note that we convert non-Euro-denominated indices
into Euros. Finally, we test all indices for autocorrelation effects. We
expected to ﬁnd a positive ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in hedge fund
return time series due to illiquid trading strategies.
23 However, we
ﬁnd autocorrelation only for the OPF indices (see Table 2).
To adjust for appraisal-smoothing and for illiquidity, we use the
Getmansky et al. (2004) method, which incorporates the whole auto-
correlation structure of the monthly return distribution (see Table 2).
This method improves on Geltner's (1991) approach because the en-
tire lag structure is considered simultaneously. In addition, there is no
need for a de-smoothing parameter (see Byrne & Lee, 1995 for the
problematic determination of the de-smoothing parameter).
The intuition behind this method is as follows. The measurable re-
turn, Rt
o, is not the true return. Rather, it is a combination of the true
return in previous periods Rt:
R
0
t ¼ Θ0Rt þ Θ1Rt−1 þ … þ ΘkRt−k
Θj ∈ 0;1 ½  ;j ¼ 0;…;kand1 ¼ Θ0 þ Θ1 þ … þ Θk:
ð1Þ
Therefore, the measurable return is the weighted sum of the true
returns of the previous periods. It is obvious that the mean of the ob-
servable returns is equal to the mean of the true returns. And the
standard deviation of the measurable returns is smaller than that of
the true returns. Eq. (2) describes the relationship between the stan-









1 þ … þ Θ2
k
σ ≤σ; ð2Þ
14 See Ross and Zisler (1991) and Geltner (1991) for an extensive discussion.
15 Other, more secondary, reasons are inﬂation-linked lease contracts and the inclu-
sion of inﬂation in the appraisal.
16 Maurer et al. (2004) show in this context that the autocorrelation of real returns is
substantially lower.
17 See McAllister, Baum, Crosby, Gallimore, and Gray (2003) and Pagliari, Scherer, and
Monopoli (2004) for more detailed discussions.
18 See Coleman and Mansour (2005) for further details.
19 We compute three different indices because not all OPFs are investable, and some
funds require a high minimum investment. The ﬁrst index represents the total OPF
market; the second includes only investable funds. The third index includes only funds
investable for retail investors. There are only marginal differences between the three
indices, and our results do not depend on which one is used. Therefore, we use the total
market index in the following analysis. Tables are available upon request from the
authors.
20 Different calculation methods did not lead to any changes in our results. Thus, we
use only the value-weighted index as per Maurer, Reiner and Rogalla (2004). Tables
are available from the authors upon request.
21 For robustness, we repeated our analysis including the DAX and the REXP. We
found no important effects. Tables are available upon request.
22 We wanted to include an index of German direct real estate to better analyze the
“complementary” role of OPFs to the two established investment types. We considered
the DIX (Deutscher Immobilien Index), which is published by the data provider Invest-
ment Property Databank GmbH (IPD) and tracks German real estate market perfor-
mance. However, the DIX is only available on an annual basis. Thus, the data
granularity does not match our monthly observations. We also decided against chang-
ing our methodology to annual observations because we would lose a great deal of
information.
23 See Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) for further details.
Table 2
Autocorrelation structure of OPFs. This table shows the autocorrelation coefﬁcient for lags 1 through 12 of the monthly return distributions for the February 1991–December 2008
period for the value-weighted OPF index. Values in bold indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 99% conﬁdence level.
L a g 1234567891 0 1 1 1 2
0.6140 0.5296 0.5192 0.5542 0.5085 0.4613 0.4314 0.4737 0.4839 0.4450 0.3910 0.4244
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Table 3 for the effect on the risk measures after de-smoothing).
Inorderto calculate the true returns, we can estimate theweighting
factors θkby using a maximum likelihood estimation. We use the infor-
mation that the measurable returns can be considered as a moving-
average process where the weighting factors are constant. Finally, we
can calculate the true returns using the estimated weighting factors.
Table 3 illustrates the inﬂuence of the autocorrelation on the OPF
descriptive statistics. It also provides descriptive statistics for the var-
ious indices over our February 1991–December 2008 sample period.
Equitymarkets have average monthly returns ranging from −0.01%
(NIKKEI) to 0.65% (S&P) 500. Bond markets show returns ranging from
0.57% per month for Japan to 0.63% for Europe over our sample period.
The OPF average monthly return of 0.42%
24 is higher than the average
money market return of 0.36% per month, and higher than the REIT re-
turn of 0.01%.
Equity markets on average have the highest total risk as measured by
monthly standard deviations, about 4.87% for Europe and 6.67% for Japan.
Only commodities and REITs exhibit similarly high standard deviations.
Bond markets have substantially lower monthly standard devia-
tions, about 1.13% for Europe and 3.54% for Japan. Hedge funds exhibit
a comparable risk level, with a standard deviation of 1.53% per month.
Note that even after adjusting for the positive autocorrelation
from appraisal-smoothing, OPFs have a very low standard deviation
of 0.33% per month. Without the autocorrelation correction, this per-
centage would be only 0.21%. Only the money market exhibits a lower
risk, at 0.17%.
Unlike OPFs, REITs exhibit a comparable risk to equity markets,
with a standard deviation of 7.5%. When we consider additional
(downside) risk measures like the square root of lower partial mo-
ments 2 (LPM), conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), and maximum
drawdown (MaxDD), we ﬁnd that the ranking of asset classes from
lowest to highest risk remains the same. We are therefore able to ac-
count for the “fat tail” risks explicitly, which is not possible with the
standard deviation.
Examining higher moments of the return distribution (skewness
and excess kurtosis), we ﬁnd that OPFs exhibit positive skewness. In
contrast, European and U.S. equities, European and U.K. bonds, hedge
funds, and REITs all exhibit negative skewness. The return distribution
of commodities and hedge funds is almost symmetrical.
However, excess kurtosis is positive for all asset classes, especially
for OPFs (2.33) and hedge funds (4.39).
25 This implies that the prob-
ability of extreme returns is higher than expected under a normal re-
turn distribution. Considering the Jarque–Bera statistic in Table 3,w e
reject the assumption of a normal distribution of monthly returns for
all indices when the entire sample period is considered (except U.S.
and Japanese equities).
Table 4 shows the correlations of OPFs with the other asset classes.
Note that OPFs have almost no correlation with equity markets and
other alternative investments, which implies a high diversiﬁcation
potential. They also have a slightly positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant positive correlation with bond markets, and a relatively high sig-
niﬁcant positive correlation (0.48) with money markets. These
positive correlations result from investments in liquid money market
instruments and in bond markets to ensure fund liquidity.
26
5. Efﬁcient asset allocation under different risk measures
5.1. Description of the optimization procedure
Because most return distributions are not normal (see Table 2),
we must consider higher moments and downside risk measures.
Any skewness effects, such as those measured for REITs, will other-
wise be neglected, as well as the effects of extreme returns (positive
excess kurtosis) that we can observe for hedge funds and OPFs (see
again Table 3). We can thus incorporate into the optimization proce-
dure characteristics such as downside risk that are caused by the
higher moments of the return distribution. This will also help to re-
duce the likelihood of biased and suboptimal portfolio weights.
We consider four different risk measures. The last three are suit-
able for covering therisk inthe tail (downside) of the distribution: 1)
Std (Markowitz, 1952)2 )L P M( Harlow, 1991), 3) CVaR (Rockafellar
& Uryasev, 2000, 2002), and 4) MaxDD (Grossman & Zhongquan,
1993). Hence, LPM, CVaR, and MaxDD implicitly incorporate higher
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for monthly return distributions. This table gives the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, square root of lower partial moment 2 with threshold
0 (LPM), conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) with a 95% conﬁdence level, and maximum drawdown (MaxDD) for the monthly return distribution for the period February 1991–De-
cember 2008. All measures are based on monthly data. The assets considered are OPFs before and after an autocorrelation (AC) adjustment (using Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov's
(2004) method), equity markets (Nikkei 500, S&P 500, DJ Stoxx 600), bond markets (J.P. Morgan Japan, U.S., Europe, and U.K. Government Bond Indices), money markets (MM)
(LIBOR), and alternative investments (S&P GSCI, HFRI Fund of Funds Composite Index, and FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Germany). All indices are total return (or their distributions were
reinvested), and all are denominated in Euros. We found no autocorrelation effects for the time series of equity and bond markets or for alternative investments. We use the Jarque
and Bera (1980) test to test the assumption of normally distributed monthly returns. All statistics are based on continuous returns.
Open-ended property
funds
Equity markets Bond markets and money markets Alternative investments
With AC Without AC NIKKEI S&P 500 DJ STOXX 600 JPM Japan JPM US JPM Europe JPM UK MM S&P GSCI HFRI FoHF REITs
Mean (%) 0.42% 0.42% −0.01% 0.65% 0.37% 0.57% 0.61% 0.63% 0.57% 0.36% 0.30% 0.53% 0.01%
Std. dev. (%) 0.21% 0.33% 6.67% 5.05% 4.87% 3.54% 2.98% 1.13% 2.47% 0.17% 6.35% 1.53% 7.50%
Kurtosis 4.31 5.33 3.05 3.21 4.08 6.29 3.42 3.23 3.55 3.66 4.07 7.39 7.85
Skewness 0.64 0.21 0.21 −0.26 −0.84 1.09 0.50 −0.32 −0.24 1.26 −0.48 −0.48 −0.26
LPM 0.00% 0.02% 2.66% 1.67% 1.71% 1.01% 0.88% 0.23% 0.71% 0.00% 2.27% 0.34% 2.51%
CVaR 0.05% −0.30% −13.14% −10.52% −12.66% −5.50% −4.54% −1.85% −4.98% 0.17% −14.6% −3.12% −19.22%
MaxDD 0.21% 1.07% 73.13% 60.82% 58.20% 40.38% 25.28% 6.71% 19.27% 0.00% 61.11% 15.92% 84.30%
Jarque–Bera
statistic
30.2⁎⁎⁎ 50.2⁎⁎⁎ 1.53 2.80⁎⁎ 35.5⁎⁎⁎ 139⁎⁎⁎ 10.5⁎⁎⁎ 4.22⁎ 4.78⁎ 60.91⁎⁎⁎ 18.6⁎⁎⁎ 180⁎⁎⁎ 212⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates that the assumption of a normal distribution of monthly returns is rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
⁎⁎ Indicates that the assumption of a normal distribution of monthly returns is rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
⁎ Indicates that the assumption of a normal distribution of monthly returns is rejected at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
24 As a robustness check, we replicated the OPF index of Maurer et al. (2004) for the
January 1975–December 2003 time period, and compared the descriptive statistics
(with autocorrelation). We found the same monthly mean (0.50%) and monthly stan-
dard deviation (0.20%).
25 The autocorrelation adjustment for appraisal-smoothing increases the kurtosis of
OPFs from 4.31 to 5.33. We explain this increase as follows: As kurtosis increases, the
probability of extreme returns also increases, which is interpreted as higher risk.
26 Typical German OPFs have 25% to 49% of their assets invested in money markets
and bond markets (see Maurer et al., 2004).
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robustness check on the validity of the results when higher moments
are ignored.
Next, we use the four risk measures to calculate efﬁcient mixed-
asset portfolios for retail and institutional investors. A portfolio is
characterized as efﬁcient when no other combination of assets pro-
vides lower risk for the same expected return. For the following port-
folio optimizations, we minimize the risk (for every risk measure
separately) for the given expected portfolio returns E rp
  
. We formu-
late the optimization problem as follows:
min
x RM ~ r ðÞ ð 3Þ
subject to the restrictions
E rp
hi
¼ randx1 þ … þ xn ¼ 1;∀i ¼ 1;…;n
where rp is the portfolio return, and xi is the percentage weight
invested in security i.
The optimization is restricted by budget constraints (full invest-
ment), and by non-negative weights (no short sales). Investments
can be made in all assets considered in Table 3.
We differentiate among three investor types. The ﬁrst two rep-
resent retail investors with different risk and return attitudes; the
third is a representative institutional investor (life insurer).
Depending on the risk and return attitudes (retail investors) and
the regulatory framework (institutional investors), we set weight
ranges for equities, bonds, and alternative investments or upper
bounds (for institutional investors, these are set by German invest-
ment law).
The weight ranges for retail investors are set according to the
average retail investor portfolio weight in Germany for the respec-
tive asset class, and depending on the risk and return attitude pub-
lished by the BVI. We decided to set these ranges because retail
investors tend to maintain their initial portfolio allocations, a phe-
nomenon known as anchoring (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
However, the investment restrictions do not strengthen or drive
the obtained results for the OPFs. We ﬁnd that the implied optimal
portfolio weights for OPFs are always higher when relaxing the
restrictions.
27
The investment restrictions are as follows:
• For a traditional retail investor, we assume weights of 10% to 20% in
equities, 45% to 65% in bonds, 0% to 5% in alternative investments,
and 20% to 40% in money markets. This investor's portfolio structure
is conservatively defensive.
• For a modern retail investor, we assume a more aggressive portfolio,
including weights of 15% to 35% in equities and 10% to 20% in alterna-
tive investments. Correspondingly, the weights for bond markets (35%
to 55%) and money markets (5% to 25%) are lower.
27 Tables and ﬁgures for the optimization without weight restrictions or different
weight ranges are available from the authors upon request.
Table 4
Correlation matrix.This table shows the correlations between the asset classes from Table 3. For OPFs, we use the value-weighted total market index; for equity markets, we use the
Nikkei 500, the S&P 500, and DJ Stoxx 600; for bond markets, we use the J.P. Morgan Japan, U.S., Europe, and U.K. Government Bond Indices; for money markets, we use LIBOR; and
for alternative investments, we use the S&P GSCI, the HFRI Fund of Funds Composite, and the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Germany indices. Values in boldface are signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the 5% level.
OPFs NIKKEI S&P 500 DJ STOXX 600 JPM Europe JPM U.S. JPM Japan JPM U.K. REITs S&P GSCI HFRI FoHF MM
OPFs 1.00 −0.01 0.15 0.09 0.39 0.29 0.22 0.29 −0.03 0.06 0.01 0.48
NIKKEI −0.01 1.00 0.49 0.52 −0.02 0.22 0.38 0.14 0.16 0.30 0.10 −0.04
S&P 500 0.15 0.49 1.00 0.82 0.05 0.46 0.23 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.12 0.03
DJ STOXX 600 0.09 0.52 0.82 1.00 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.46 0.29 0.16 −0.05
JPM Europe 0.39 −0.02 0.05 0.01 1.00 0.41 0.23 0.51 −0.12 −0.05 −0.14 0.18
JPM U.S. 0.29 0.22 0.46 0.15 0.41 1.00 0.50 0.52 −0.13 0.20 −0.01 0.14
JPM Japan 0.22 0.38 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.50 1.00 0.21 −0.09 0.03 −0.07 0.20
JPM U.K. 0.29 0.14 0.32 0.23 0.51 0.52 0.21 1.00 −0.10 0.16 0.19 0.03
REITs −0.03 0.16 0.35 0.46 −0.12 −0.13 −0.09 −0.10 1.00 0.01 0.11 −0.04
S&P GSCI 0.06 0.30 0.30 0.29 −0.05 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.01 1.00 0.18 −0.02
HFRI FoHF 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.16 −0.14 −0.01 −0.07 0.19 0.11 0.18 1.00 0.02
MM 0.48 −0.04 0.03 −0.05 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.03 −0.04 −0.02 0.02 1.00
Table 5
Optimal portfolio weights and risk reduction potential of all asset classes (Markowitz approach). This table shows the optimal portfolio weights for the minimum standard devi-
ation (Std) portfolio and the annual Std subject to the weight limits discussed in Section 4.1. We perform both analyses for the traditional and modern retail investors. The period
is February 1991–December 2008.
OPFs NIKKEI S&P 500 DJ STOXX 600 JPM Europe JPM US JPM Japan JPM UK REITs S&P GSCI HFRI FoHF MM Std
Traditional retail investor
Without OPFs (%) 0% 3% 6% 5% 55% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 3.33%
Traditional retail investor
With OPFs (%) 25% 0% 7% 3% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 2.59%
Modern retail investor
Without OPFs (%) 0% 5% 14% 6% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 4.97%
Modern retail investor
With OPFs (%) 34% 0% 12% 3% 36% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 5% 3.35%
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tory investment restrictions for life insurers. This implies a maximum
investment of 20% in foreign exchange positions and 35% in risky in-
vestments (like equities and hedge funds). In addition, non-European
equities and indirect commodity investments may not exceed 10%,
and hedge funds are limited to 5%. The cumulative REITs and OPFs
may not exceed 25%.
We use these three investor types and four different optimization
risk measures to ﬁndthe optimal portfolio within the stipulated invest-
ment limits. Initially, we perform the optimization without OPFs, add-
ing them afterwards to evaluate the impact of expanding the universe.
Wefurtherinvestigatetheinﬂuenceoftheﬁnancialcrisisontherobust-
ness of the optimal portfolio weights.
5.2. Open-ended property funds in retail investor portfolios
To identify the diversiﬁcation potential of OPFs for retail investors
(traditional and modern), we ﬁrst apply a classical Markowitz optimi-
zation (subject to the weight limits discussed in the prior section).
We then determine the portfolio weights of the minimum standard
deviation portfolio without OPFs.
In the second step, we allow for OPFs, and compare the risk and the
optimal portfolio weights of an identical expected return level portfolio
(see Table 5). We also apply two robustness checks, as follows: 1) we
use the risk measures LPM, CVaR, and MaxDD to identify the downside
protectionpotentialfor OPFs (see Fig.1),and 2) we calculatetheresults
from a U.S. perspective (see Table A1).
Both types of retail investors realize a substantial risk reduction
(as measured by the standard deviation of portfolio returns) for the
same return level when OPFs are added to the portfolio. Traditional
retail investors, with a more defensive portfolio conﬁguration, can
lower their portfolio annual standard deviations from 3.33% to 2.59%
(see Table 5). This translates to an approximately 20% risk reduction.
Modern retail investors can reduce risk by about 32% by adding OPFs.
Note from Table 5 that the standard deviation is reduced from 4.97%
to 3.35% p.a.
28
In examining the portfolio composition of the traditional retail
investor's optimal portfolio, we ﬁnd that OPFs add a substantial
weight of 25% (see again Table 5). Correspondingly, the weights of
money markets and bonds are reduced by about 10 percentage points
each.
For the more aggressive retail investor, the addition of OPFs is opti-
mal with a 34% weight. OPF investment leads to a reduction in equity
and money market weights of about 10% each,as well as a 5% reduction
in hedge fund weights.
Interestingly, the weight of bonds is not reduced, but is actually
slightly increased by 1 percentage point. For both investors, we do
not consider REIT investments, because this asset class is completely
dominated by OPFs. Table 5 provides a detailed breakdown of portfolio
weights for all asset classes.
Because most return distributions are not normally distributed,
we apply the above described analyses for three additional risk mea-
sures (LPM, CVaR, and MaxDD) to incorporate potential tail risks (see
Fig. 1). Similarly to the Std risk measure, we ﬁnd that OPFs have
higher portfolio weights in modern retail investor portfolios than in
traditional investor portfolios. This is not surprising, however, since
the traditional portfolio is already defensive.
However, the importance of OPFs decreases as risk measures focus
more on the downside. This can be seen by the lower allocation to the
LPM, CVaR, and particularly MaxDD risk measures. Nevertheless, we
believe that OPFs should have a signiﬁcant allocation (at least 9%) in
the portfolios of both types of retail investors.
To determine whether OPFs signiﬁcantly enhance portfolio perfor-
mance, we conduct in- and out-of-sample Sharpe ratio tests accord-
ing to Jobson and Korkie (1981) and Ledoit and Wolf (2008). For
the in-sample test, we use the portfolios constructed above and the
historical returns for February 1991–December 2008. We then gener-
ate 5000 time series of monthly returns for one year using Efron and
Tibshirani's (1994) block-bootstrap method.
Fortheout-of-sampletest,weusethehistoricalreturnsforFebruary
1991–December 1999 to determine portfolio weights. We then use
returns for January 2000–December 2008 to generate 5000 time series
of future returns and ﬁnd that OPFs lead to statistically signiﬁcant
higher Sharpe ratios (see Table 6).
In summary, we tested for the robustness of the obtained optimal
portfolio weights for both types of retail investors and applied four
risk measures. For downside protection, OPFs decreased in impor-
tance, but the optimal holdings were still signiﬁcant. These results
were conﬁrmed by Sharpe ratio tests.
5.3. Open-ended property funds in institutional investor portfolios
Fig. 2 shows the efﬁcient portfolios (efﬁcient frontiers) when we
optimize the institutional investor portfolios with and without OPFs,
and following the institutional investor constraints described in
Section 5.1. The methodology chosen in the previous subsections for
retail investors looks different to the presentation here, but it works
in the same manner. For retail investors we choose for two types of
risk aversion (traditional and modern) weight ranges for different in-
vestment types and apply a “point estimator” given the universe of
investmentopportunitiesandtherestrictions.Incomparisonweconduct
an optimization approach for institutional investors (represented exem-
plary by life insurers) given their regulatory investment restrictions (see
§ 88 InvG) and calculate an efﬁcient frontier. When choosing representa-
tive optimal portfolios on the efﬁcient frontier both approaches are di-
rectly comparable.
Note in Fig. 2 that the efﬁcient frontier is moved upwards by add-
ing OPFs, especially for the defensive portfolios. Hence we ﬁnd that
OPFs improve the risk and return proﬁle signiﬁcantly.
To verify whether OPFs can also improve the efﬁcient frontier sig-
niﬁcantly, we conducted a spanning test following Chiang and Lee

































Fig. 1. Optimal portfolio weights for open-ended property funds for different risk mea-
sures.This ﬁgure shows the optimal portfolio weights subject to the weight limits dis-
cussed in Section 5.1 for OPFs in the traditional and modern retail portfolios
by applying four different risk measures (Std, LPM, CVaR, and MaxDD). The period is
February 1991–December 2008.
28 We repeat our analysis for different time series inception dates. The results show
no signiﬁcant differences. Furthermore, the results hold from a U.S. perspective, and
are qualitatively comparable to the EU results (see Table A1).
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The exact value of the likelihood ratio is 23.78.
Fig. 3 shows the portfolio composition along the efﬁcient fron-
tier, i.e., the weights of each asset class for the different expected re-
turn levels. OPFs are initially included at the regulatory limit of 25%.
With an expected return of more than 6.9% p.a., however, their
weight gradually decreases as they are replaced by assets with a
higher expected return, such as hedge funds. Overall, we conclude
that OPFs are important in defensive portfolios geared towards
risk reduction, but are also essential in more growth-oriented
portfolios.
However, given the non-normality of some return distributions, a
central assumption of the Markowitz approach is violated (see Table 2).
Therefore, we evaluate the role of OPFs using three downside risk mea-
sures (LPM, CVaR, and MaxDD) (see Fig. A1 in the Appendix A). When
focusing on downside risk, we ﬁnd that OPFs play a similarly important
role as in a Markowitz approach.
5.4. Thesuitabilityofopen-endedpropertyfundsfordifferentholdingperiods
In the next step, we analyze the inﬂuence of OPFs on portfolio returns
and risk for different holding periods (this is comparable to Liang, Myer,
and Webb's (1996) bootstrap simulation approach). Our starting point is
a benchmark portfolio with no OPFs that consists solely of predeﬁned
fractions of equities, bonds, and money market investments. Equity
and bond allocations are determined by the minimum-variance portfolio
for the proxy indices from Table 3 (obtained by a Markowitz portfolio
optimization).
From these benchmark portfolios, we successively increase the
proportion of OPFs from 0% to 25% in three steps (1%, 10%, and
25%). We simultaneously decrease the other asset class weights uni-
formly, so that the relative weights of the benchmark portfolio before
the inclusion remain constant.
We simulate portfolio returns for the various holding periods
(one, ﬁve, and ten years) using a bootstrap approach. As a robustness
check, we conduct in- and out-of-sample analyses. For the in-sample,
we use historical returns from February 1991–December 2008 to de-
termine the allocations of the two asset classes (minimum-variance
portfolios for bonds and stocks, respectively) to the benchmark port-
folios. Afterward, we construct time series of future returns from the
same historical returns.
For the out-of-sample, we use historical returns from February
1991 to July 1999 to construct the benchmark portfolios, and histor-
ical returns from August 1999 to December 2008 to construct time
series of future returns. We simulate 1000 runs for each holding
period.
To gauge how beneﬁcial OPFs are in mixed-asset portfolios for
different holding periods, we calculate risk-adjusted performance
for every risk measure separately over the three holding periods.
We use the same equation: (portfolio return−risk-free return)/
risk measure. We calculate the Sharpe ratio (SR) for standard devia-
tion, the Sortino ratio (SoR) for LPM, the return on conditional
value-at-risk (RoCVaR) for CVaR, and the Sterling ratio (StR) for
MaxDD.
Note from Table A2 that the increase of OPF weights in the bench-
mark portfolio lowers expected returns in the in-sample analysis for
all benchmark portfolios and for all holding periods. However, the
successive inclusion of OPFs leads to a steady enhancement of risk-
adjusted performance for all risk measures and for all holding pe-
riods.
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Fig. 2. Efﬁcient portfolios for institutional investors (Markowitz approach).This ﬁgure
shows the efﬁcient frontiers with and without OPFs using Std as the risk measure
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Fig. 3. Composition of efﬁcient portfolios for institutional investors (Markowitz
approach).This ﬁgure shows the portfolio weights in the portfolios on the efﬁcient
frontier for the asset classes we consider. We use Std as the risk measure that depends
on the expected return (subject to the weight limits discussed in Section 5.1). The ob-
servation period is February 1991–December 2008.
Table 6
Sharpe ratio test. This table shows the Sharpe ratios for the portfolios of the in- and out-of-sample analyses. Calculations are based on Efron and Tibshirani's (1994) standard block-
bootstrap Monte Carlo simulation with ﬁve lags and 1000 runs. For the in-sample analysis, we use the periods of February 1991–December 2008 to generate time series of future
returns. For the out-of-sample analysis, we use the periods of February 1991–December 1999 to construct the portfolio, and January 2000–December 2008 to construct time series
of future returns. For the in-sample analysis, the risk-free return is the average money market rate for February 1991–December 2008 (3.56% p.a.); for the out-of-sample analysis,
the period is February 1991–July 1999 (2.69%).
In-sample Out-of-sample
Traditional retail investor without OPFs 0.80⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎
Traditional retail investor with OPFs 1.45⁎⁎⁎ 0.38⁎⁎⁎
Modern retail investor without OPFs 0.87⁎⁎⁎ −0.13⁎⁎⁎
Modern retail investor with OPFs 1.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes that the assumption of equal Sharpe ratios is rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively, according to Jobson and Korkie (1981) and Ledoit and Wolf (2008).
29 Note that the RoCVaR decreases as the weight of OPFs in the benchmark portfolio
increases, in contrast to all other risk-adjusted performance measures. However, this
indicates an increase in risk-adjusted performance as well, because a higher CVaR in-
dicates lower risk. The interpretation of the RoCVaR is thus inverse compared to other
risk-adjusted performance measures.
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returns for all holding periods and initial benchmark compositions.
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In summary, we show that the return distribution has favorable
risk and return characteristics when OPFs provide daily liquidity. On
this basis, OPFs are intensively allocated to investor portfolios (re-
gardless of the optimization method used or the investor type consid-
ered). We also demonstrate the validity of our results for different
holding periods.
However, as we noted in the introduction, these positive attri-
butes come at a cost: OPF managers must temporarily suspend
share redemption if liquidity falls below 5%. We next discuss the
primary risk for investors: that they may need to sell their shares
on the secondary market during the suspension. Note further that
the value of liquidity can be quite large. As Benveniste, Capozza,
and Seguin (2001) show, claims on illiquid assets can increase by
as much as 12%–22%.
Illiquidity can also have a major impact on portfolio composition.
Anglin and Gao (2011) analyze how the liquidity (autocorrelation
and trading inability) of an asset can affect an individual's investment
decision when that individual has an uncertain need to liquidate.
They ﬁnd that this illiquidity can change the risk proﬁle dramatically.
Furthermore, Lin and Vandell (2007) show that illiquidity creates
a difference between ex-ante and ex-post returns. Although the
expected returns are equal, ex-post risk is found to be lower than
ex-ante risk by a factor dependent on illiquidity. Because this factor can
belargeeven forlong holding periods,illiquiditycanseverelyaffect port-
folio composition.
However, Bond, Soosung, Zhenguo, and Vandell (2007) and Lin,
Liu, and Vandell (2009) show that this illiquidity risk can be lowered
when holding illiquid assets that have uncorrelated illiquidity risks.
Cheng, Lin, and Liu (2010) also study the difference between ex-
ante and ex-post risk. They introduce an illiquidity risk metric and in-
tegrate it with price risk to make different asset classes comparable.
For real estate, they ﬁnd that using their illiquidity risk metric increases
risk signiﬁcantly and hence reduces optimal real estate exposure in
portfolios.
Finally, Bond and Slezak (2010) incorporate illiquidity into a port-
folio optimization approach with uncertainty aversion, following
Garlappi, Wang, and Uppal (2007). In this setting, the allocations to
real estate are also lower than in standard portfolio optimization ap-
proaches. To summarize these ﬁndings, illiquidity should be a major
factor for investors when investing in real estate.
However, the liquidity risk associated with OPFs is different
from that of common direct real estate investments. Under normal
circumstances, OPFs provide perfect liquidity, i.e., shares can be
redeemed at net asset value. This is different from direct real estate,
especially when “direct real estate” refers to ofﬁce buildings or
shopping malls. When fund liquidity falls below 5%, shares cannot
be redeemed and thus must be sold on the secondary market. For
these reasons, we modeled illiquidity implicitly by de-smoothing
the OPF return series, which increases all risk measures (see
Table 3 again). This increase in risk also affects optimal portfolio
holdings negatively, as noted in the literature cited above, where il-
liquidity is considered explicitly. We strongly believe our approach
satisﬁes the features of OPFs more fully. We follow Cumming, Haß,
and Schweizer (2010) and Cavenaile, Coën, and Hübner (2011) by
using the “corrected” return series in the asset allocation, and we an-
alyze the special liquidity risk of OPFs arising from secondary market
trading in the next section.
6. Liquidity risk analysis for open-ended property funds
In this section, we analyze OPF performance around the temporary
suspension of share redemptions and the resulting (potential) liquidity
risk that arises from trading in the secondary market at the regional ex-
change Börse Hamburg.
OPFs are required to redeem shares daily, so they normally hold
some liquid assets because of the difﬁculty of disposing of property
quickly. Investment laws in Germany (§ 80 InvG) mandate minimum
holdings of 5% and maximum holdings of 49% of assets in cash, money
market instruments, or bonds, which ensure theoretically that re-
demptions of outstanding shares can be met at all times. As Table 4
shows, the risk and return proﬁles of OPFs are positively correlated
with money markets and bond markets, and do not correspond as
much with property positions.
31
However, there is an ever-present risk that investors may try to
redeem too many shares at a time, and that the liquidity position
could become too low to satisfy all the redemptions. If the liquidity
position falls below 5%, OPFs may suspend share redemptions in
order to raise funds by, e.g., selling property investments.
32 As de-
tailed in § 80c para. 2 InvG and § 81 InvG, these periods of suspension
can last up to two years.
33
The primary reason for such share redemption suspensions is a
real estate market downturn, which often results from a downturn
in the capital markets. For example, during a downturn, landlords
may ﬁnd they can no longer obtain the same level of rental income.
Furthermore, they may not be able to sell their properties at reason-
able prices quickly enough. OPF management will desire to maintain
their prior high appraisal values so they can adjust the NAV to market
developments. Investors fearful of such developments may thus try to
redeem more shares than have been issued and over a shorter time
period than usual.
In the event of a temporary suspension of share redemptions, in-
vestors can sell their shares on the secondary market. However, the
prices they obtain may not be comparable to the NAVs calculated by
capital investment companies. Prices on the secondary market can
be lower due to slower value adjustments, appraisals, earnings man-
agement, and liquidity reduction. Note also that the NAV may not be
generally reﬂective of the market's assessment of share value, but the
secondary market will be. In the next two subsections, we discuss
how the secondary OPF market developed and we gauge the impact
on investors, over both the short and long term.
6.1. Major development of the secondary OPF market
German OPFs have experienced temporary suspensions of share
redemptions twice in their history, during 2005/2006, and during
2008/2010.
34 However, there were different circumstances surround-
ing each period, as we explain further next.
Prior to the 2005/2006 suspension, the market feared that some
funds would need to revalue at least part of their property portfolios.
This high appraisal uncertainty led to massive share redemption in a
short period, and three funds (DB Grundbesitz Invest, KanAm Grun-
dinvest and KanAm Grundinvest US) temporarily suspended redemp-
tions (see Fecht & Wedow, 2010).
30 This result remains valid when we use the August 1999–December 2008 period to
construct the benchmark portfolios, and when we use the February 1991–July 1999
period to construct time series of future returns.
31 See Maurer et al. (2004) and Gullett and Redman (2005) for more extensive
discussions.
32 See Sebastian and Tyrell (2006) for further details.
33 By law, a fund may only suspend redemptions for a maximum of twelve months.
By contractual agreement, this can be extended to twenty-four months. Alternatively,
management may opt to only partially suspend redemptions, so that shares can only be
redeemed monthly instead of daily.
34 For a detailed description of events during the 2005/2006 period, see Bannier,
Fecht, and Tyrell (2007).
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the temporary suspension during the 2008–2010 global ﬁnancial cri-
sis was more signiﬁcant for the OPF market. Investors' liquidity pref-
erences increased considerably after the crisis, as they were much less
willing to risk tying up funds for up to two years in the face of such
severe market volatility. Thus, as compared to the 2005/2006 period,
the second crisis was ultimately a global one.
A total of twelve OPFs suspended share redemptions from October
27 to 30, 2008. One of the OPFs had reopened by January 2009, and by
December 2009, eight more had begun redeeming shares again. But
the uncertainty continued. By November 2009, temporary share re-
demption suspensions were instituted again at two of the OPFs that
had reopened.
6.2. Estimation of OPF market liquidity
To further study and assess how the suspensions affected valuations,
we use data from the Börse Hamburg, which is a regional exchange that
OPFs use for secondary market transactions. From January 2, 2004 to De-
cember 8, 2009, a period that covers both the crisis periods, we obtain
dataforalltradedOPFsforalltradingdays,includingpricesandthenum-
ber of shares traded.
To obtain a ﬁrst impression about OPF market liquidity and the as-
sociated liquidity risks, we investigate several measures in the sec-
ondary market (trading volume, as well as the Amihud (2002) and
Roll (1984) liquidity measures). We thus capture periods with and
without suspensions of share redemptions. In the case of suspensions,
the measured liquidity is composed of OPFs that suspended share re-
demptions and those accepting share redemptions.
However, OPF fund management ﬁxes prices only once per day,
meaning investors must commit to selling before they can know the
prices. Thus, they may wish to sell on the secondary market even
when share redemptions are not suspended. OPFs also have a further
risk motivation (the temporary suspension risk). We analyze this risk
and the associated valuation effects in the next two subsections.
As Fig. 4 shows, trading volume and the average number of funds
traded on the secondary market increased dramatically during the
two crisis periods (see also Table 7). We note further that the length
of the suspensions was negatively correlated with trading volume.
During the 2008–2010 global crisis, trading volume increased to an
average of 10 million Euros per day (compared to about 4 million
during the ﬁrst crisis).
We next analyze liquidity, especially the price impact of orders, in
the OPF market, in order to deepen our understanding of how resis-
tant the market is during “normal” and more volatile times. However,
we cannot observe liquidity directly, as it has several dimensions that
cannot be captured by a single measure. To quantify liquidity risk, we
use two common measures: the Amihud (2002) measure, and the
Roll (1984) measure.
Roll's liquidity measure is order-based. In the absence of intraday
data, we can approximate the spread, the difference between the bid







where ΔPt is the price change on day t.
Amihud's liquidity measure, in comparison, is trade-based. It mea-






where rt is the return on day t, and Volumet is the Euro trading volume
on day t.
Fig. 5 shows Amihud's and Roll's liquidity measures for OPFs over
time. Noticeable, the liquidity during crisis is as high as during ‘nor-
mal’ times and we do not observe obvious peaks. This ﬁnding is also
supported by Table 7 as the differences in the average liquidity is in-
signiﬁcant. In contrast, the volatility of both liquidity measures is
much higher during ‘normal’ times. In detail Roll's liquidity measure
is almost twice volatile during ‘normal’ times than during crisis pe-












































































5-day verage number of traded OPFs
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Fig. 4. Number and volume of traded OPFs in the secondary market.This ﬁgure shows the daily ﬁve-day average number of traded OPFs and the ﬁve-day average trading volume
from January 2004 to December 2009.
Table 7
Amihud's (2002) and Roll's (1984) liquidity measures. This table shows the mean and
variance of Amihud's (2002) (scaled by the factor 10
6) and Roll's (1984) liquidity mea-
sures for all OPFs traded at Börse Hamburg during crisis and non-crisis periods. Crisis
periods are December 2005–April 2006 and October 2008–December 2009. The com-
plete observation period is January 2004–December 2009. Differences in means and





Mean Variance Mean Variance
Crisis periods 0.6719 0.1011⁎⁎⁎ 0.2738 0.0026⁎⁎
Non-crisis periods 0.6772 0.3741⁎⁎⁎ 0.3027 0.0043⁎⁎
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates that the assumption of equal means respectively variances are rejected
at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
⁎⁎ Indicates that the assumption of equal means respectively variances are rejected
at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
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holdings prefer to hold their OPF shares with the expectation of pos-
sibly redeeming them when share redemptions are reinstated. Thus,
investors might expect that NAVs will not be written down to the
same degree that share prices would decrease if sold through the
stock exchange.
Even if the secondary market liquidity does not appear to be sig-
niﬁcantly inﬂuenced by crises, investors still tend to reevaluate risk
and therefore redeem their shares which can lead to temporal sus-
pension of share redemptions — a special form of liquidity risk not
covered by the used liquidity measures. This Phenomenon is explicit-
ly analyzed in the next two subsections.
6.3. Estimation of short-term valuation effects
We next measure market reactions to the temporary suspensions
of share redemptions by calculating their discount from the second-
ary market compared to the net asset value (NAV) calculated by the
OPFs themselves around the disclosure date (t0). Following Brown
and Warner (1985) we applied standard event study methodology
to calculate the average discounts (AD). In detail we ﬁrstly divide
the difference of every temporarily suspended OPFs NAV and its sec-
ondary market price by its NAV. Secondly, we sum up the discounts
for all OPFs and divide it by the number of temporarily suspended
OPFs.
We use a standard t-test statistic to draw statistical inferences
about the different event windows for the average discounts (see
Table 8). Note from Table 8 and Fig. 6 that the average discount in-
crease signiﬁcantly for OPFs that announce a suspension of share re-
demptions. These results hold for all event windows.
35
The increase in investors' liquidity preferences was reﬂected in an
increase in the average discount: Before the announcement of a sus-
pension, it was about 0%; after the announcement, it increased to
about 6%. During a share redemption suspension, there are many
sources of uncertainty for investors. For example, how soon will sus-
pended funds reinstate share redemptions? Is there a potential for
“controlled liquidation” (will OPFs be forced to sell properties at
“ﬁre-sale” prices)? And, furthermore, the secondary market might
only be used if investors believe the value of OPF properties will de-
crease further, since otherwise they could wait until a reopening
and sell to NAV.
The discount thus reﬂects 1) a premium for reduced OPF liquidity
(perfect liquidity versus secondary market liquidity) and uncertainty
over the duration of the suspension period (up to two years), and 2)
the write-off potential if funds are forced to sell or revaluate proper-
ties. Investors react to the uncertainty by incorporating into (second-
ary) market prices the new information that some OPFs have
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Fig. 6. Average discount of suspended OPFs relative to temporary share redemp-
tions.This ﬁgure shows the average discount of suspended OPFs for both the 2005/
2006 and 2008/2010 crisis periods relative to the suspension date t0.
Table 8
Secondary market comparison of market phases when all OPFs are redeemable and
when some are temporarily suspended. This table shows the average discount (AD)
for different event windows, both tested for statistical signiﬁcance. In the columns Ab-
normal trading volume and Traded OPFs, we test the hypotheses that we will ﬁnd
higher trading volume and a higher number of OPFs traded during the speciﬁc event
windows, compared to periods when no OPF is temporarily suspended.
Event window AD Abnormal trading volume Traded OPFs Nobs
[−10, +10] 3.28%⁎⁎⁎ 1.67·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 2.99⁎⁎⁎ 14
[−10, +90] 5.82%⁎⁎⁎ 3.62·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 3.35⁎⁎⁎ 9
[0, +5] 6.12%⁎⁎⁎ 3.70·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 3.42⁎⁎⁎ 14
[0, +30] 6.35%⁎⁎⁎ 4.36·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 4.10⁎⁎⁎ 12
[0, +60] 6.46%⁎⁎⁎ 4.38·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 4.13⁎⁎⁎ 9
[0, +90] 6.57%⁎⁎⁎ 4.10·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 3.37⁎⁎⁎ 9
[0, +120] 6.50%⁎⁎⁎ 3.81·10
6⁎⁎⁎ 2.78⁎⁎⁎ 9
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
35 We also calculate ADt based on capital instead of equal weighting. The results re-







































































Amihud’s Liquidity Measure Roll's Liquidity Measure
1-Jan-08
Fig. 5. Amihud's (2002) and Roll's (1984) liquidity measures.This ﬁgure shows Amihud's (2002) (scaled by the factor 10
6) and Roll's (1984) liquidity measures for all OPFs traded at
Börse Hamburg. The observation period is January 2004–December 2009.
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secondary market dynamics change during redemption suspensions.
As illustrated by the increases in trading volume and the number of
traded OPFs during both periods, investors tend to ﬂock to the sec-
ondary market when OPF liquidity decreases.
Note that the magnitude of the second crisis, when comparing the
discounts, is again much higher than the ﬁrst. We can see clearly from
Fig. 7 how the average abnormal discounts increased, peaking at 20%
by the end of the observation period. We interpret this as evidence
that the market expects the three remaining OPFs not to begin
accepting share redemptions again before the end of the two-year
time limit, thus forcing a “ﬁre-sale” of properties to ensure liquidity
(controlled liquidation).
Therefore, we can interpret one part of the abnormal average dis-
count as the market's expectation of seeing a discount off the OPF's
NAV when management is forced to sell properties. Further evidence
is the steep increase in volatility of the abnormal average discount at
the end of the observation period. Because the two-year time limit is
known, we believe the uncertainty must be driven by the uncertainty
surrounding the expected property selling prices.
6.4. Estimation of long-term valuation effects
In this subsection, we compare the short-term valuation results
with a buy-and-hold alternative. We again use OPFs that temporarily
suspended share redemptions, and we determine how investors
fared if they held their shares, instead of selling on the secondary
market. To estimate the abnormal returns for the temporarily sus-
pended OPFs versus the overall OPF market, we use three time
frames: 1) the twelve-month period prior to the suspension, 2) the
actual period of suspension, and 3) the twelve-month period after
the suspension. To retain an investor perspective, we use buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to gauge how the OPFs that sus-
pended redemptions ultimately performed compared to the overall
market.
Table 9 analyzes the ﬁrst crisis period, 2005/2006. Note that av-
erage BHARs are positive for all three time periods, which implies
that the sample of suspended OPFs performed better than the
overall market before, during, and after the suspension. Examining
the individual funds in Table 10, we see that only the DB Grundbesitz-
Invest shows slightly negative returns before and during the suspension.
However, its BHAR for the twelve months after reopening is quite high,
at 10.7%.
These results indicate that investors did not redeem their shares
before the suspension because of poor performance. Also, the overall
positive performance during and after the suspension indicates that






















































































Number of all traded OPFs
Number of traded temporarily suspended OPFs
Average discount of all traded OPFs
Average abnormal discounts 
Volatility of the average NPV discount for traded temporarily suspended OPFs
Fig. 7. Descriptive survey of the secondary market for OPFs.This ﬁgure shows the number of all traded OPFs (ﬁve-day average), the number of all temporarily suspended OPFs (ﬁve-
day average), the average discount of all traded OPFs, the average abnormal discounts, and the volatility of the average NPV discount for traded temporarily suspended OPFs from
January 2004 to December 2009.
Table 10
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for temporarily suspended open-ended property funds.
This table shows average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for temporarily sus-
pended open-ended property funds for the twelve months before suspension of share re-
demptions, the suspension period itself, and the twelve months afterwards. The
benchmark for calculating BHARs is the value-weighted total market index without the
suspended funds. The KanAm Grundinvest US is denominated in U.S. dollars, and was
not converted to Euros for this analysis. The calculation of BHARs is based on continuous
returns,andfollowsBarberand Lyon's (1997) approach.The data forthe pricesanddistri-
butions of the temporarily suspended funds come from Thomson Financial Datastream.
Average of all suspended funds BHAR
12 months before suspension 2.18%
During suspension 0.92%
12 months after suspension 4.66%
Table 9
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for temporarily suspended open-ended property
funds (detailed analysis). This table shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)
for DB Grundbesitz-Invest, KanAm Grundinvest, and KanAm Grundinvest US for the
twelve months before suspension of share redemptions, the suspension period itself,
and the twelve months afterwards. The benchmark for calculating BHARs is the
value-weighted total market index without the suspended funds. The KanAm Grundin-
vest US is denominated in U.S. dollars, and was not converted to Euros for this analysis.
The calculation of BHARs is based on continuous returns, and follows Barber and Lyon's
(1997) approach. The data for the prices and distributions of the temporarily sus-
















101 L.H. Haß et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 21 (2012) 90–107In contrast to the ﬁrst crisis period, the drivers of the 2008/2010
period were the ﬁnancial crisis and the resulting high investor prefer-
ence for liquidity. Interestingly, we again ﬁnd no negative BHARs for
investors for the twelve months prior to the suspension. The OPFs
that suspended share redemptions had a 5.39% average return for
the twelve months prior to the event.
The overall market without the suspended funds realized a slightly
lower return of 5.21%, which yields a positive BHAR of 0.18%. Admit-
tedly, we cannot conduct the same calculation for the period of
share suspension and the subsequent twelve months. Thus, we make
a case for one OPF that successfully reopened, although we know the
results are likely to be the opposite for OPFs that were not able to pro-
vide liquidity again.
As an example, consider SEB ImmoInvest, which realized a 2.4%
return during its October 29, 2008 through May 29, 2009 suspension.
Fig. 8 graphs SEB ImmoInvest's performance, and shows that no de-
creases occurred during this period. Note that the share price continued
to be calculated on a daily basis by regular appraisal surveys during the
suspension. And investors were still able to trade shares on the second-
ary market.
In summary, the results from our short- and long-term analyses
paint different pictures. The short-term analysis highlights that, dur-
ing temporary share suspensions, investors who opt to sell their
shares in the secondary market must accept substantial discounts
off the NAV. These discounts have historically peaked at about 20%,
and apply especially when investors believe the OPF may need to
“ﬁre-sell” properties to provide liquidity.
The results from our long-term analysis, however, show that, dur-
ing the 2005/2006 crisis, investors were better off holding their
shares than selling them in the secondary market. Admittedly, the re-
cent crisis has proven that holding shares until the OPF reopens may
only be beneﬁcial if it does indeed reopen within the two-year time
limit. Otherwise, investors may face high uncertainty about the sell-
ing price of portfolio properties, reﬂected in discounts as high as
20% in the secondary market.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we aimed to determine how OPFs, an alternative in-
vestment vehicle to direct and listed real estate investments, contrib-
ute to asset allocation. The speciﬁc regulatory framework of OPFs
shifts the return distribution of the underlying real estate investment
towards relatively steady and smooth returns with low variation.
However, investors are subject to substantial liquidity risk when
share redemptions are temporarily suspended. Our main results are
as follows.
OPFs contribute signiﬁcantly to investor portfolios by increas-
ing expected portfolio returns, decreasing portfolio risks (as per
several risk measures), and increasing diversiﬁcation in private
and institutional investor portfolios. These results hold for differ-
ent optimization approaches and holding periods, and with an ad-
justment for autocorrelation in return time series (along with the
resulting substantial increase in risk). We tested our results for
robustness with several Monte Carlo simulations (in- and out-of-
sample).
However, a potential liquidity risk for investors can result if share
redemptions for OPFs are temporarily suspended. We studied the
only two time periods this has occurred, in 2005/2006 and 2008/
2010. We found that, during the ﬁrst crisis period, the ﬁrst three Ger-
man funds that suspended share redemptions outperformed the
overall OPF market before, during, and after the suspensions. During
the 2008/2010 period (the current ﬁnancial crisis), however, we
found that twelve funds suspended share redemptions, and they
exhibited higher average returns than the overall market before the
suspension.
We note that some of those funds have already reopened, how-
ever, and may yet realize positive returns. And for those OPFs that
are unlikely to reopen within the two-year time limit, there is a
high uncertainty about the NAVs as reported by the OPFs them-
selves. Therefore, investors wishing to sell their shares during the
redemption suspension must accept discounts as high as 20% in
the secondary market (or even higher when controlled liquidation
is expected as ultima ratio). Even when the OPFs are likely to
reopen in a timely manner, investors normally face discounts
of about 6% off the NAVs reported by the capital investment
companies.
In conclusion, we show that OPFs offer a high diversiﬁcation po-
tential for investor portfolios, but there are signiﬁcant risks if share
redemptions are temporarily suspended. We believe OPFs are an at-
tractive alternative to the well-established direct and listed real es-
tate market investments.
Acknowledgments
We thank the editors J.A. Batten, L. Nail and the anonymous re-
viewer for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful
to Felix Miebs, Juliane Proelss, Maximilian Trossbach, Marcel Tyrell
and participants of the Midwest Finance Association 2010 in Las
Vegas for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Kay
Homann from Börse Hamburg for providing access to their databases.



















Fig. 8. SEB ImmoInvest performance chart.This ﬁgure charts the performance of SEB ImmoInvest from September 1, 2008 to June 15, 2009. Pricing data come from Thomson Financial
Datastream.
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103 L.H. Haß et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 21 (2012) 90–107Fig. A1. Efﬁcient portfolios and the respective portfolio holding for institutional investors with downside risk measures.These ﬁgures illustrate 1) the efﬁcient frontiers with and without
OPFsusingLPM,CVaR,andMaxDDastheriskmeasuresofchoice,and2)theportfolioweightsfortheassetclassesinthe portfoliosontheefﬁcientfrontierwithLPM,CVaR,andMaxDDas
risk measures dependent on the expected return. All calculations are subject to the weight limits discussed in Section 4.1. The observation period is February 1991–December 2008.
Table A1
Optimal portfolio weights and risk reduction potential of all asset classes for U.S. investors (Markowitz approach). This table shows the optimal portfolio weights for the minimum
standard deviation (Std) portfolio and the annual Std subject to the weight limits discussed in Section 4.1. All time series have been converted into U.S. dollars. We perform both
analyses for the traditional and the modern retail investor. The period is February 1991–December 2008.
OPFs NIKKEI S&P 500 DJ STOXX 600 JPM Europe JPM US JPM Japan JPM UK REITs S&P GSCI HFRI FoHF MM Std
Retail investor without OPFs (%) 0% 0% 15% 0% 54% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 4.69%
Retail investor with OPFs (%) 20% 0% 10% 0% 10% 32% 3% 0% 0% 0% 5% 20% 2.43%
Retail investor without OPFs (%) 0% 0% 25% 0% 44% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 4.51%
Retail investor with OPFs (%) 25% 0% 15% 0% 15% 17% 3% 0% 0% 0% 20% 5% 2.94%
Table A2
Portfolio return and risk for various holding periods. This table shows the expected return, standard deviation, square root of lower partial moment 2 with threshold 0 (LPM), CVaR
with conﬁdence level 95%, and maximum drawdown for one- to ten-year holding periods with increasing OPF weights in the benchmark portfolio. The ﬁrst column gives the initial
composition of the benchmark portfolio, which consists only of equities, bonds, and money market investments. Allocations to the three asset classes are determined by the Mar-
kowitz portfolio selection process, where the minimum-variance portfolio is selected. When OPFs are included, the equity, bond, and money market weights are reduced accordingly.
Calculations are based on Efron and Tibshirani's (1994) standard block-bootstrap Monte Carlo simulation with ﬁve lags and 1000 runs. For the in-sample analysis, we use the February
1991–December 2008 period to construct the benchmark portfolio and a time series of future returns. For the out-of-sample analysis, we use the February 1991–December 1999 period
to construct the benchmark portfolio, and January 2000–December 2008 to construct a time series of future returns. To evaluate risk-adjusted portfolio performance, we calculate a cor-
responding risk-adjusted performance measure for each risk measure. For the standard deviation, we calculate the Sharpe ratio (SR), for LPM, we calculate the Sortino ratio (SoR), for
CVaR, we calculate the return on conditional value-at-risk (RoCVaR), and for MaxDD, we calculate the Sterling ratio (StR). All risk-adjusted performance measures are calculated
using the same arithmetic equation: (portfolio return−risk-free return)/risk measure. For the in-sample analysis, the risk-free return is the average money market rate for
February 1991–December 2008 (3.58% p.a.); for the out-of-sample analysis, it is February 1991–December 1999 (2.56%). Results remain stable when using 0% or 3% for the
risk-free return.
Benchmark portfolio OPFs In-sample Out-of-sample
Portfolio performance Risk-adjusted
performance
Portfolio performance Risk-adjusted performance
1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year 5 years 10 years
Stock 0%–bonds 50%–money
market 50%
Exp. return 0% 6.62% 33.34% 68.53% 2.12% 11.42% 25.42%
1% 6.60% 33.27% 68.38% 2.14% 11.52% 25.60%
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Benchmark portfolio OPFs In-sample Out-of-sample
Portfolio performance Risk-adjusted
performance
Portfolio performance Risk-adjusted performance
1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year 5 years 10 years
10% 6.48% 32.63% 67.02% 2.34% 12.43% 27.20%
25% 6.26% 31.53% 64.66% 2.65% 13.90% 29.77%
Std 0% 5.35% 12.72% 18.77% 0.57 1.11 1.40 4.67% 10.01% 13.02% −0.09 −0.21 −0.26
1% 5.30% 12.60% 18.60% 0.57 1.11 1.41 4.63% 9.91% 12.88% −0.09 −0.20 −0.25
10% 4.84% 11.54% 17.12% 0.60 1.16 1.45 4.21% 8.98% 11.66% −0.05 −0.12 −0.14
25% 4.06% 9.75% 14.60% 0.66 1.26 1.54 3.51% 7.46% 9.66% 0.02 0.06 0.10
LPM 0% 2.12% 5.08% 7.46% 1.43 2.77 3.53 1.80% 3.83% 4.92% −0.24 −0.54 −0.69
1% 2.10% 5.03% 7.40% 1.44 2.79 3.54 1.78% 3.79% 4.87% −0.23 −0.52 −0.66
10% 1.92% 4.61% 6.80% 1.51 2.91 3.65 1.62% 3.44% 4.40% −0.14 −0.31 −0.36
25% 1.61% 3.89% 5.79% 1.66 3.16 3.88 1.35% 2.85% 3.63% 0.06 0.14 0.27
CVaR 0% 0.12% −1.87% −2.64% 24.64 −7.53 −9.99 −0.88% −2.38% −2.75% 0.50 0.87 1.23
1% 0.13% −1.85% −2.61% 24.02 −7.58 −10.04 −0.87% −2.35% −2.72% 0.48 0.84 1.17
10% 0.15% −1.66% −2.37% 19.40 −8.07 −10.50 −0.76% −2.09% −2.43% 0.30 0.51 0.66
25% 0.19% −1.34% −1.95% 14.30 −9.19 −11.50 −0.59% −1.67% −1.95% −0.14 −0.25 −0.50
MaxDD 0% 3.26% 7.09% 9.39% 0.93 1.99 2.80 3.96% 7.99% 9.20% −0.11 −0.26 −0.37
1% 3.22% 7.00% 9.28% 0.94 2.01 2.82 3.91% 7.87% 9.05% −0.11 −0.25 −0.35
10% 2.83% 6.18% 8.29% 1.02 2.17 3.00 3.44% 6.80% 7.78% −0.07 −0.16 −0.21
25% 2.20% 4.85% 6.63% 1.22 2.53 3.39 2.67% 5.12% 5.81% 0.03 0.08 0.17
Stock 25%–bonds
25%–money market 50%
Exp. return 0% 7.58% 38.63% 77.71% 1.41% 8.27% 20.66%
1% 7.56% 38.52% 77.50% 1.44% 8.42% 20.90%
10% 7.36% 37.52% 75.57% 1.71% 9.69% 23.08%
25% 7.02% 35.76% 72.16% 2.15% 11.73% 26.53%
Std 0% 7.96% 18.55% 26.57% 0.50 1.05 1.34 7.07% 15.23% 19.89% −0.16 −0.34 −0.41
1% 7.88% 18.38% 26.34% 0.50 1.05 1.34 6.99% 15.07% 19.67% −0.16 −0.34 −0.40
10% 7.18% 16.84% 24.29% 0.53 1.09 1.37 6.35% 13.64% 17.75% −0.13 −0.28 −0.32
25% 6.02% 14.25% 20.79% 0.57 1.16 1.44 5.29% 11.29% 14.63% −0.08 −0.16 −0.15
LPM 0% 3.15% 7.42% 10.60% 1.27 2.61 3.35 2.72% 5.85% 7.56% −0.42 −0.89 −1.08
1% 3.12% 7.35% 10.51% 1.28 2.62 3.36 2.69% 5.79% 7.48% −0.42 −0.88 −1.06
10% 2.84% 6.73% 9.68% 1.33 2.71 3.45 2.44% 5.23% 6.73% −0.35 −0.73 −0.85
25% 2.38% 5.69% 8.27% 1.44 2.90 3.62 2.03% 4.32% 5.53% −0.20 −0.41 −0.41
CVaR 0% 0.01% −2.90% −3.89% 410.30 −6.68 −9.13 −1.47% −3.77% −4.33% 0.78 1.39 1.88
1% 0.01% −2.87% −3.86% 291.27 −6.71 −9.16 −1.45% −3.72% −4.28% 0.77 1.36 1.85
10% 0.05% −2.60% −3.52% 77.91 −7.04 −9.48 −1.29% −3.33% −3.83% 0.66 1.14 1.49
25% 0.11% −2.13% −2.95% 32.65 −7.75 −10.16 −1.02% −2.69% −3.09% 0.41 0.65 0.73
MaxDD 0% 5.27% 11.36% 14.44% 0.76 1.71 2.46 6.48% 13.84% 16.19% −0.18 −0.38 −0.50
1% 5.21% 11.23% 14.29% 0.76 1.72 2.47 6.40% 13.64% 15.95% −0.18 −0.37 −0.49
10% 4.64% 10.05% 12.91% 0.82 1.82 2.59 5.70% 11.92% 13.82% −0.15 −0.32 −0.41
25% 3.69% 8.08% 10.56% 0.93 2.05 2.84 4.54% 9.15% 10.48% −0.09 −0.19 −0.22
Stock 25%–bonds
50%–money market 25%
Exp. return 0% 6.76% 34.44% 69.63% 2.83% 14.95% 32.18%
1% 6.74% 34.36% 69.47% 2.84% 15.02% 32.28%
10% 6.59% 33.60% 67.96% 2.96% 15.56% 33.17%
25% 6.34% 32.29% 65.35% 3.16% 16.46% 34.63%
Std 0% 4.36% 10.42% 15.37% 0.73 1.46 1.79 3.48% 7.50% 9.94% 0.08 0.20 0.34
1% 4.32% 10.32% 15.24% 0.73 1.47 1.79 3.44% 7.42% 9.84% 0.08 0.21 0.35
10% 3.94% 9.46% 14.04% 0.76 1.52 1.84 3.13% 6.73% 8.92% 0.13 0.31 0.49
25% 3.32% 8.03% 12.02% 0.83 1.62 1.93 2.61% 5.61% 7.42% 0.23 0.53 0.79
LPM 0% 1.74% 4.21% 6.18% 1.82 3.61 4.44 1.34% 2.89% 3.82% 0.20 0.51 0.88
1% 1.72% 4.17% 6.13% 1.83 3.62 4.45 1.32% 2.86% 3.78% 0.21 0.53 0.92
10% 1.57% 3.82% 5.64% 1.91 3.76 4.57 1.20% 2.59% 3.42% 0.33 0.80 1.28
25% 1.32% 3.23% 4.81% 2.09 4.04 4.82 1.00% 2.15% 2.83% 0.60 1.38 2.06
CVaR 0% 0.20% −1.37% −1.95% 15.98 −11.06 −14.07 −0.56% −1.53% −1.82% −0.47 −0.96 −1.86
1% 0.20% −1.36% −1.93% 15.76 −11.13 −14.13 −0.55% −1.51% −1.80% −0.51 −1.01 −1.94
10% 0.22% −1.21% −1.75% 13.92 −11.86 −14.73 −0.47% −1.34% −1.59% −0.85 −1.55 −2.74
25% 0.24% −0.96% −1.44% 11.41 −13.55 −16.05 −0.34% −1.05% −1.26% −1.74 −2.84 −4.62
MaxDD 0% 2.23% 4.75% 6.37% 1.42 3.20 4.31 2.49% 4.74% 5.36% 0.11 0.31 0.63
1% 2.20% 4.69% 6.30% 1.43 3.23 4.33 2.46% 4.66% 5.27% 0.11 0.33 0.66
10% 1.92% 4.11% 5.59% 1.57 3.49 4.61 2.13% 3.98% 4.49% 0.19 0.52 0.97
25% 1.46% 3.17% 4.42% 1.90 4.12 5.24 1.60% 2.94% 3.30% 0.38 1.01 1.77
Stock 50%–bonds
50%–money market 0%
Exp. return 0% 6.04% 30.90% 62.83% 2.44% 12.83% 27.55%
1% 6.03% 30.85% 62.72% 2.46% 12.92% 27.70%
10% 5.95% 30.38% 61.75% 2.62% 13.67% 29.05%
25% 5.81% 29.58% 60.07% 2.88% 14.90% 31.25%
Std 0% 4.02% 9.79% 14.74% 0.61 1.19 1.40 3.48% 7.43% 9.65% −0.03 −0.09 −0.13
1% 3.98% 9.70% 14.61% 0.62 1.20 1.41 3.45% 7.36% 9.55% −0.03 −0.08 −0.11
10% 3.64% 8.88% 13.43% 0.65 1.26 1.46 3.14% 6.68% 8.66% 0.02 0.03 0.03
25% 3.06% 7.52% 11.45% 0.73 1.38 1.56 2.62% 5.57% 7.20% 0.12 0.25 0.34
LPM 0% 1.60% 3.91% 5.85% 1.54 2.98 3.53 1.34% 2.84% 3.64% −0.09 −0.23 −0.34
1% 1.58% 3.87% 5.80% 1.55 3.00 3.54 1.33% 2.81% 3.60% −0.08 −0.20 −0.30
10% 1.44% 3.54% 5.32% 1.64 3.14 3.68 1.21% 2.55% 3.26% 0.05 0.07 0.08
25% 1.21% 3.00% 4.53% 1.83 3.45 3.95 1.01% 2.12% 2.70% 0.31 0.66 0.91
CVaR 0% 0.17% −1.35% −2.00% 14.19 −8.62 −10.31 −0.60% −1.69% −1.97% 0.20 0.39 0.63
1% 0.18% −1.34% −1.98% 13.98 −8.69 −10.37 −0.59% −1.67% −1.95% 0.17 0.34 0.56
10% 0.19% −1.19% −1.79% 12.22 −9.39 −10.96 −0.51% −1.48% −1.73% −0.11 −0.12 −0.15
25% 0.22% −0.94% −1.46% 9.96 −10.99 −12.26 −0.37% −1.16% −1.37% −0.84 −1.21 −1.79
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